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Petr Panov & Andrei Semenov


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# **The World of Ethnic Regional Autonomies: Introducing the New Dataset**

PETR PANOV

*Perm University, Russia*

ANDREI SEMENOV

*Perm University, Russia*

*The article introduces the Ethnic Regional Autonomies Dataset (ERAD), which describes the contemporary population of politically autonomous regions established on the basis of ethnicity. We conceptualize an ERA as a special case of accommodative policy related to decentralization/devolution of powers to relevant territorially concentrated ethnic groups. The data captures the major characteristics of ERAs across the world, including demographic, economy, and politics. We describe the process of compiling the comprehensive list of ethnoregional autonomies and discuss the issues of coding and mis-categorization. Finally, we present descriptive statistics and illustrative cases alongside exploratory analysis of the data. We conclude with the prospects for future developments.*

## INTRODUCTION

From the very beginning, scholars of ethnic politics recognized the importance of institutional and territorial arrangements in maintaining the balance between different ethnic groups. Starting with the works of Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz,<sup>1</sup> political decentralization and territorial devolution have been considered as means to alleviate fervent interethnic struggle. Territorial autonomy based on ethnicity remains vigorously discussed among scholars, who argue that granting autonomy either prevents or breeds secession and violence.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, the subject is mostly studied in the context of ethnic conflict management.<sup>3</sup> A more nuanced

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Address correspondence to Petr Panov, Political Science Department, Perm State University, 15 Bukireva Street, Perm 614990, Russia. E-mail: [petr@gmail.com](mailto:petr@gmail.com)

approach to decentralization in conflict-prone states stresses the importance of the contextual features that stipulate the impact of autonomous arrangements on interethnic relations.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time, ethnoregional autonomies (ERAs) now constitute a realm of their own with considerable variation in their origins, institutional structure, and economic, demographic, and ethno-political characteristics. In this article, we argue that the study of ERAs requires exploring this variation in depth. Indeed, ethnic-based subnational autonomies do not constitute a “concrete, coherent institution,” a feature that makes it difficult “to compile a comprehensive list of autonomous regions.”<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, we attempt to develop a conceptual framework that allows us to capture the basic features of ERAs and tally them across the globe. Although institutional arrangements for accommodation of spatially concentrated ethnic groups vary greatly across the globe, we argue that the main feature of an ERA is a fairly strong linkage between ethnicity and political institutions that entails a certain degree of autonomy. Based on this approach to conceptualization, we introduce a novel dataset (the Ethnic Regional Autonomies Dataset - ERAD) on the entire population of first-tier subnational ethnic territorial autonomies that existed in 2001–2015.<sup>6</sup>

This dataset contributes to the existing literature on decentralization and ethnic politics in three ways. First, it presents a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing the ERA as a phenomenon and describes the coherent set of criteria and indicators that captures it empirically. Based on this conceptualization, we situate contemporary ERAs among the numerous other subnational units and demonstrate their versatile nature. Second, we present a list of ERAs across the world and analyze the variation in their major characteristics. The exploratory data analysis based on a principal component technique highlights the differences in origins, institutions, and contextual features; it also allows examining combination and juxtaposition between them.

Third, we discuss how the dataset can be used for comparative studies of ethnic politics and decentralization. Since the ERAD is restricted to ethnic regional autonomies, it cannot be used for the explanation of their origin or the assessment of their effectiveness in conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the ERAD encompasses the universe of ERAs and contains a large number of variables; it allows conducting full-scale comparative studies within this class of subnational entities putting a broad range of research questions concerning the explanation of variability of ethnic politics in ERAs, as well as the effectiveness of different institutional designs for ethnic diversity management. Whereas other datasets tend to focus either on ethnic groups (Minorities at Risk and its extensions, Ethnic Power Relations and its extensions) or conflicts (Armed Conflict Dataset and its extensions, ACLED, PITF), the ERAD focuses on ethnic

autonomous regions. The novelty of this data hinges upon the idea of going beyond the country-level to the subnational level of analysis.<sup>7</sup>

We structure our article as follows. The first part emphasizes the novelty of the ERAD and positions it among existing datasets dedicated to ethnicity and ethnic politics. Next, we propose and explain the definition of ethnoregional autonomy, going down the ladder of abstraction from general notion to empirical indicators. We then present the list of ERAs. Afterwards, we turn to the structure of the dataset and show the principal characteristics and their variation across the units of observation. We conclude with the limitations of the present version of the ERAD and avenues for its further development.

## ERAD WITHIN THE UNIVERSE OF ETHNIC-RELATED DATASETS

Recent developments in quantifying and systematizing the determinants of ethnic peace and conflict have significantly extended our knowledge about the subject.<sup>8</sup> Some datasets like Minorities at Risk<sup>9</sup> and Ethnic Power Relations (EPR)<sup>10</sup> take ethnic groups as the basic units of observations. They distinguish “politically-active communal groups” or “politically relevant ethnic groups” respectively from the universe of ethnic groups globally and present various data on these groups in the group-year format. Other datasets such as the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset – ACD<sup>11</sup> have a focus on conflicts.<sup>12</sup> It is possible to separate ethnic conflicts among them, which has been done by some scholars in ACD2EPR dataset that combine EPR and ACD linking ethnic groups from the former to conflict actors from the latter. A number of projects contain more specific information; for instance, the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) is devoted to the transformation of militant and ex-militant groups into political parties in post-conflict societies and presented as group-year data.<sup>13</sup> As another example, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham’s dataset captures self-determination movements from 1960 to 2003 and has a self-determination movement/government dyad-year as the unit of observation.<sup>14</sup>

Ethnoregional autonomy is frequently included in these datasets among the other variables. The inclusion is based on the assumption that an ERA might be an essential factor in the studies of ethnic conflict and the ways to accommodate/prevent it. In EPR, following a consociational approach, ethnic autonomy is treated as a territorial aspect of power-sharing along with governmental power-sharing institutions. Lars-Eric Cederman and his colleagues show that a combination of these dimensions is the most effective way for ethnic conflict resolution.<sup>15</sup> Combining the data from EPR and MAR, David Siroky and John Cuffe argue that it is

not autonomy *per se*, but the withdrawal of autonomous status that stimulates ethnic group's separatism.<sup>16</sup> Dawn Brancati demonstrates that decentralization reduces the probability of ethnic conflict by giving ethnic groups autonomy over their own political, social and economic affairs. At the same time, it increases the chances for ethnic strife and secessionism indirectly by encouraging the growth of regional parties.<sup>17</sup> Graham Brown shows that autonomy accelerates ethnoregional protests only if it is accompanied by a high ethnic distinctiveness of an autonomous unit in combination with relatively low regional wealth.<sup>18</sup>

There have been some more specific datasets that focus on power-sharing arrangements. The Inclusion, Dispersion and Constraints (IDC) Power-Sharing Dataset collects data on three dimensions of power-sharing, including territorial autonomies as an indicator variable.<sup>19</sup> The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) contains systematic information on the promises and practices of power-sharing between governments and rebels in an event data format for a five-year period after a peace agreement took place.<sup>20</sup>

Consequently, existing datasets frequently include "autonomy" either as an aggregate indicator, that is its presence/absence, or some basic characteristics. However, at present there has been no dataset specifically focused on ethnoregional autonomies. For example, both MAR and EPR concentrate on ethnic groups, not regions, and include only indicator variable for autonomy. The IDC dataset includes some variables about autonomous arrangements but restricts them to *de jure* institutions and applies them to the country-level, not specific regions. The PSED encompasses only cases of autonomies which were established in 1989–2006 as a compromise between governments and rebels after civil wars.

The need for the Ethnic Regional Autonomies dataset stems from the desire to unfold "the black box" of autonomy and present it in a ready-to-use format. In contrast to other data, the unit of observation in the ERAD is neither an ethnic group, nor an ethnic conflict, but an ethnically relevant first-tier subnational autonomy. Its primary purpose is to present the comprehensive information on the number of ERAs' features including origins, institutional structure, and economic, demographic, and ethno-political characteristics for every year from 2001 to 2015. Accordingly, the data are presented in the "autonomy-year" format. Although the dataset partially relies on information from other projects, it also contains dozens of variables that were extracted from specific sources like national censuses and autonomy-level statistical bureaus, as well as data collected by the authors themselves. On the whole, the ERAD allows for the examination of ethnoregional autonomies in a broad comparative perspective and the tackling of various research questions within the ethnic politics field.

The universe of ERAs in the dataset is restricted to the first-tier subnational level. Ethnic groups on this level interact directly with the national government. Undoubtedly, there are numerous other cases of territorially autonomous regimes for the ethnic groups on the lower tiers of governance; some of them even have a very complex nested structure, like in India. However, we limit our analysis here to the first subnational level: first, for conceptual clarity, and second, because the information on the ethnic territorial autonomies beyond the first tier is far scarcer and more unevenly distributed.

## DEFINING ETHNIC REGIONAL AUTONOMY

Although there exists a general consensus regarding the definition of the term “ethnic regional (sometimes dubbed territorial) autonomy” that encompasses all the entities when “autonomy was granted on the basis of ethnic identity,”<sup>21</sup> the major challenge is how to narrow it down to relevant empirical indicators. As the term itself suggests, there are two dimensions of the ERA to conceptualize: the autonomous status of a specific territory and its links to ethnicity. The first dimension usually refers to institutions that enable policymaking at the subnational level. For instance, Yash Ghai defines ERA as “a device to allow ethnic or other groups claiming a distinct identity to *exercise direct control over affairs* of special concern to them” (emphasis ours).<sup>22</sup> Similarly, Manuel Vogt and his colleagues note that to qualify a group as autonomous “there must be a meaningful and active regional executive organ that operates below the state level ... but above the local administrative level, and group representatives must exert actual influence on the decisions of this entity, acting in line with the group’s local interests.”<sup>23</sup> Both definitions assume that the distinction between “*de jure*” and “*de facto*” political autonomy should be made and delineation lies in the idea of influence/direct control over a set of issues exercised by representatives of an ethnic group.

Although we agree with the conceptualization of ERA as an ethnic-based subnational entity that institutionalize the power of the group to govern over certain policy areas, we propose alternative specifications of its dimensions. We follow Gary Goertz and James Mahoney’s logic that for quantitative research, it is necessary to understand the concepts as latent variables that then can be measured via different indicators<sup>24</sup>. For each of the two basic attributes (autonomy and ethnic character of a region) of the concept at hand, we employ a set of criteria that circumscribe an ERA as a distinct phenomenon. We then assign specific empirical indicators that allow for the identification of whether a subnational unit fits into these criteria (see [Figure 1](#)).




FIGURE 1 Conceptual Structure of "Ethnoregional Autonomy".

## Autonomy

Autonomy is strongly associated with self-government (self-rule) of any entity – a person or a social group. Therefore, it is conventional wisdom to distinguish between personal (individual rights and liberties), cultural, and territorial autonomy. Unlike cultural and personal autonomy, a specific feature of territorial autonomy is that it is spatially confined, that is its power extends only to a predefined area.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the scope, content, and form of territorial units' self-governance differ significantly from case to case, making it harder for researchers to define autonomy.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, there is good reason to establish a stronger criterion of self-government in order to separate the political from the mere administrative autonomy.<sup>27</sup> For the territorial unit below the state level to be counted as autonomous, it is necessary to have at least one policy area where its government sets the norms without the direct involvement of the central agencies. The primary empirical indicator of such is regional legislature: if it exists, we can conclude that at least some policy areas are tied to this level of governance, and therefore that the region has *political* autonomy.

At the same time, the establishment of territorial autonomies is strongly associated with the rise of the modern nation-state.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, autonomous subnational units are considered as parts of their host (principal) states, not as independent entities. This means that the host state should be both able and capable of controlling the subnational units,



while the latter have to comply with the authority of the central government. That is why we do not consider “associated states” to be autonomies, like the numerous unincorporated organized territories of the USA, the British Overseas Territories, etc., which are independent in their domestic affairs. Similarly, so-called “*de facto* states” and regions of “failed states” do not meet with this criterion even if these units are formally (legally) recognized as parts of the respective state by the international community (that is Abkhazia in Georgia). Empirically, the state’s control can be identified by such an indicator as a direct inclusion of an autonomous unit in national policy-making, particularly through the representation of a region in the national assembly.<sup>29</sup>

### Ethnic Character of a Subnational Unit

Following Max Weber’s tradition, we define ethnicity as a social categorization based on a subjective belief in “common origin” or “common descent” of a group’s members, regardless of what feature prompts such a belief.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, a variety of attributes can serve as ground for ethnic boundaries. Among the most common features are language, religion, and race, as well as tribes, castes, etc.<sup>31</sup>

It must be noted that in contrast to cultural autonomy, territorial autonomy might include a variety of ethnic groups; therefore, the term “ethnic territorial autonomy” appears to be problematic.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, most scholars consider this concept (and some others, like “autonomous ethnic region,” “ethnically-defined territorial autonomy,” “ethnically based autonomy,” and “ethnic autonomy regime”<sup>33</sup>) to be fairly useful for distinguishing a special class of territorial autonomies that are closely linked to a specific ethnic group. Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman thus separate a special class of autonomies that were established for the purpose of “the accommodation of ethnic diversity.”<sup>34</sup> Likewise, Liam Anderson argues that ethnic autonomies are those units in which “autonomy was granted on the basis of ethnic identity.”<sup>35</sup>

Consequently, establishing a distinct ethnic origin is necessary in order to interpret the unit in question as an ethnic autonomy. Two empirical indicators have been developed in order to capture this criterion: 1) an ERA is the result of the struggle of an ethnic group for self-determination. In other words, autonomous status represents a compromise between self-determination claims and maintenance of the state’s integrity<sup>36</sup>; 2) an ERA is the result of the implementation of top-down “ethnonational policy.”<sup>37</sup> It must be noted that these two indicators may be complementary to each other in a supply-demand fashion, that is self-determination claims (demand) meet respective top-down policy (supply) in the course of



interactions between the central authorities and the spatially concentrated ethnic group.

Some subnational units, despite their initial links to ethnicity, can experience a gradual decline in the degree of ethnic salience. Therefore, our second criterion for establishing an ethnic character of a given subnational unit is its lasting link to an active ethnicity; that is the autonomy is still perceived as “the homeland of the definite ethnic group”<sup>38</sup> that can be defined by the term “titular ethnic group.” Empirically, the current ethnic status of an autonomous region can be identified if at least one of the following indicators appears: (1) legal recognition of the special status of a certain ethnic group as a “titular ethnic group” in the region; (2) special status of a certain language as an official language of a region; (3) special preferences for a “titular group” in the distribution of high governmental positions; (4) the presence of ethnic identity in the official attributes of a unit (ethnonym in the title of a unit, ethnic symbols in flag, emblem, etc.). In sum, in the ERAD we conceptualize ethnoregional autonomy as a first-tier subnational unit that is defined by ethnicity and has a sufficiently high degree of political self-government within the sovereignty of the national state. The array of empirical indicators allows one to gauge the variability in major characteristics of ethnoregional autonomies for at least the first-tier subnational regions. We discuss the application of these indicators and the challenges arising from a lack of fitting into certain categories in the section to follow.

#### APPLYING THE RULES: LIST OF ETHNIC REGIONAL AUTONOMIES ACROSS THE WORLD

Decentralization affects states with different territorial governance structures. Political autonomy of subnational units can be found both in federal and unitary states; therefore, it is useful to think of some unitary states as the “federacies” in Daniel Elazar’s terms, where “a larger power and a smaller polity are linked asymmetrically in a federal relationship.”<sup>39</sup> Consequently, for this study we examined administrative units of the first subnational level with special autonomous status in unitary states and all units (entities) of federations. It follows that subnational units of unitary states without special status do not fall into the ERAD, even if they are ethnically defined (for example some provinces in Iran or KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, etc.),<sup>40</sup> since they lack a special autonomous status. On the other hand, many autonomous subnational units with special status such as Azores and Madeira in Portugal, Mount Athos in Greece, Vojvodina in Serbia, etc. do not accord with the definition of ERA as they are devoid of ethnic origins. In other words, we distinguish ERAs from

both ethnic regions without a special autonomous status and non-ethnic regional autonomies.

In contrast to federacies, in federations the principle of federalism is applied to all entities of the federations.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, the federation's provinces have political autonomy by definition: all we need in these cases is to check for their ethnic character.<sup>42</sup> In this regard, a useful distinction can be made between "territorial" and "ethnic" federations, where "at least one constituent territorial governance unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category."<sup>43</sup> In other words, ethnically defined constituents of federations are those units that belong to the category of ERAs.

At the same time, ethnic federations are divided into two subgroups: full (all units are ethnically defined as is the case in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, and Ethiopia,<sup>44</sup> and partial ethnofederations.<sup>45</sup> In partial ethnofederations (Russia, Canada, India), only some federal entities are ethnically relevant and considered as "homelands" for specific ethnic groups, whereas all the other regions are associated with so-called "Staatsvolk," that is "a single national (or ethnic) people that dominates a state demographically and electorally."<sup>46</sup> Thus, most of the regions of the Russian Federations (oblasts and krais) are "non-ethnic" in the sense that they are populated by Russians ("Staatsvolk"), while 21 republics and some autonomous districts are ethnically defined and consequently should be included in the list of ethnic regional autonomies.<sup>47</sup>

The full list of ethnoregional autonomies (140 cases) is presented in the Appendix. It is divided in two parts – the "core list" and the "borderline list." While the ERAs from the "core list" fully comply with the definitional criteria, 16 autonomies included in the "border-line list" remain ambiguous cases. Such an ambiguity has two sources. The first originates from the very nature of ethnicity, which is a socially changeable and contentious phenomenon. As Fredrik Barth notes, "we give primary emphasis to the fact that ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people."<sup>48</sup> Since ethnicity is a powerful sentiment contested by different actors, social boundaries should be considered as ethnic lines, especially if ethnicity becomes politically salient.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, though in most of the cases one can observe any dominant and legitimate perception of ethnic categories and ethnic boundaries as shared by the members of a society, there are some dubious cases where it is not clear if ethnicity is actually at stake. Adjarians in Georgia, Sicilians in Italy, Zanzibaris in Tanzania, and Bouganvilleans in Papua New Guinea might be considered as distinct ethnic groups; however, the strength of the ethnic grounds for the self-identification there remains unclear. In other words, all these autonomies are connected to regional identity, but it is hard to tell the salience of the ethnic component.

The second source of ambiguity is rooted in complexity of the creation process of some autonomies. Autonomy status is granted due to a combination of factors, ethnic struggle being only one among many, and in some instances empirical indicators of ethnic strife and the implementation of top-down “ethnonational policy” fail to provide us with a clear basis to judge. For example, while 18 Indian states can be interpreted as ERAs according to our criteria, in two units - Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim – it is hard to define to what extent ethnic character was a significant reason for their establishment. Similar difficulties appeared in several cases when autonomies were founded in the result of post-colonial transformation: Netherlands Antilles, French Polynesia and New Caledonia, Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia, etc.

### ERAD: STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

The Ethnic Regional Autonomies Dataset (ERAD) contains a broad range of information on all the ethnic territorial autonomies around the world in the timespan of 2001–2015. The data are presented in the “autonomy-year” format. There were some fluctuations in the number of ERAs during this period: Kurdistan in Iraq returned to autonomous status in 2005, Rodrigues was granted autonomy in 2002, Aceh (Indonesia) in 2005, and Telangana (India) was founded in 2015. South Sudan was an autonomous region in 2005–2010 and subsequently seceded from Sudan in a referendum. In Russia, six autonomous regions ceased to exist in the 2000s because of federal reform; in Ukraine, the irredentist secession of Republic of Crimea took place in March 2014. All these ERAs except Telangana are included in the ERAD. Consequently, the ERAD includes 139 ERAs in 34 states and contains 2013 “autonomy-year” observations.

The ERAD consists of approximately 150 variables accumulating data on a wide range of aspects of ethnoregional autonomies. We consulted a variety of sources in order to obtain the necessary data. Well-known datasets like the OECD, United Nations Development Program, World Development Indicators, CIA Factbook, Polity, Freedom House, and the Database of Political Institutions were used to screen for primary country-level (and sometimes autonomy-level) information. The Regional Autonomy Index has been used to describe the preferential regimes. The conflict-related variables were coded on the basis of the Conflict Barometer monitoring<sup>50</sup> and ACD2EPR dataset. Nevertheless, the main sources of the information for the ERAD were original data from national statistical services and the results of national or regional censuses. If census information was not available, secondary data from surveys or academic literature were used. We also studied national and regional

electoral statistics in detail to describe the national and autonomy-level electoral systems, as well as electoral results and different measures of power-sharing (both in the central government and on the level of autonomy).

Overall, there are seven major panels of variables that are included in the ERAD: (1) general characteristics of ERAs and their host states; (2) their ethnic composition including fractionalization and polarization, the linguistic and religious distance between the titular and dominant groups; (3) economic and demographic indicators of ERAs and their host states; (4) political and institutional background of the host states; (5) political and institutional characteristics of ERAs, including the presence of ethnoregional political parties, their electoral performance, and power-sharing arrangements; (6) preferential policies; (7) and a host of indicators for ethnic conflicts in ERAs. The codebook provides a description of the variables with the necessary links to the sources alongside coding rules for particular variables. For some indicators, missing data might constitute an issue; nevertheless, the dataset as a whole reveals a rich realm of ethnoregional autonomies across the globe in the 21st century and might be helpful for dealing with a variety of research questions. The descriptive statistics for selected data is presented in [Table 1](#).

According to our data, ethnoregional autonomies can be found in every corner of the world, even in Oceania. Asian countries that are extremely diverse in ethnic composition account for 32 percent of the autonomies, followed by post-communist states (27 percent), Sub-Saharan Africa (19 percent), and Western democracies (18 percent).

The dataset reveals a striking variation among different characteristics of autonomies. Examining the historical dynamic, we find that autonomization of territorially concentrated ethnic groups has been proliferating in the course of the 20th century and roughly coincides with democracy waves in the late 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s (see [Figure 2](#)). The oldest region in the ERAD is the Åland Islands of Finland (1921), while Indonesian Aceh is the youngest (2005).<sup>51</sup> The peak in the 1990s is mostly explained by the reorganization of three large federal multiethnic states (Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Russia), which gave birth to 49 ERAs. None of them moved to democracy, though their ERAs remain. That they didn't turn to democracy is one of the reasons why the bulk of ethnic regions with political autonomy reside inside non-democratic states (non-free and party-free) (see [Figure 3](#)). At the same time, it must be noted that alongside Russia (32 regions), Ethiopia (9), and Nigeria (14), ERAs exist in such authoritarian countries as Myanmar (7), China (5), Uzbekistan (1), etc. Consequently, we can draw the conclusion that ERAs exist in all kinds of political regimes; however, the spread of ERAs is wider across democracies. Counting countries, not autonomous regions, we find that 15 states out of 34 that have ERAs fall


**TABLE 1** Descriptive Statistics on Selected ERAD Variables for the Year 2005.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age (years)	139	36.5	18.6	10	94
Autonomy area (sq.km.)	139	186,556	440,797	46	3,103,200
Population size (by thousands of inhabitants)	139	7,429	16,7	2.0	96,879
Share of autonomy in the population of the country	139	0.05	0.10	0.0001	0.63
Level of economic development of autonomy in comparison to the country <sup>a</sup>	105	0.997	1.13	0.13	7.80
Share of titular group in the population of autonomy	123	0.59	0.26	0.01	0.97
Share of autonomy in the seats in national legislature	122	0.06	0.1	0.002	0.67
Index of representation of autonomy in national legislature <sup>b</sup>	122	2.3	4.6	0.5	36.5
Seats of autonomy in the upper house of national parliament	100	6.2	7.8	1	41
Upper house index <sup>c</sup>	100	5.4	12.8	0.4	92.2
Regional legislature size (seats)	120	80.4	83.4	12	537
Ethnic regional parties' share in regional legislature	138	0.27	0.38	0.00	1.00

<sup>a</sup>Calculated as the ratio of gross regional product per capita to country's GDP per capita.

<sup>b</sup>Calculated as the ratio of share of autonomy in the seats in national legislature to share of autonomy in the population of the country.

<sup>c</sup>Calculated as the ratio of share of autonomy in the seats in the upper house of national parliament to share of autonomy in the population of the country.

**FIGURE 2** Ethnoregional Autonomies' Legal Establishment/Reorganization Acts by Decade.




FIGURE 3 Proportion of ERAs across Political Regimes (Freedom House index).

into the category of “free states,” while 11 are under “partly free” and 8 – “non-free”.

In the data, we find huge variations in both economic and demographic features of ERAs. Examining the relative wealth of the autonomies in comparison to country averages, we calculated the ratio of gross regional product per capita to national GDP per capita, and therefore the ratio of 1 indicates the economic parity between a province and a country. As a result, we find that almost 30 percent of the ERAs (31 out of the 105 for which we have data) exceed the country average in terms of wealth; the richest being the oil-producing Nenets Autonomous District in Russia that back in 2005 had a GRP *per capita* almost 8 times higher than that of the country. At the same time, Russia hosts the poorest province as well. Also in 2005, Ingushetia’s GRP *per capita* was only 13 percent of Russian aggregated economic output. In general, our data reveal that most ERAs in the world are not that wealthy. While the mean level of economic development as compared to the country level is close to 1, the median is 0.8. Hence, redistribution conflicts, which are usually invoked as an explanation of ethno-political conflicts in ERAs,<sup>52</sup> can be attributed to a relative majority of cases: Mindanao (Philippines), Baluchistan (Pakistan), the poorest Nigerian states of Borno and Yobe, etc. On the other hand, we find some fairly wealthy ethnic autonomous regions with striking and long-standing conflicts between them and the central governments – Indian Punjab, Catalonia, and the oil-rich South Sudan that eventually achieved independence in 2011. This is in line with the findings of some scholars who argue that it is the relatively wealthy regions that are more prone to separatism.<sup>53</sup>

Turning to the ethnic composition of the population, we have incorporated a number of alternative indicators for its measurement. Unfortunately, none of them cover the entire population, and thus several additional variables were constructed to assess the degree of heterogeneity in a region. When census or survey data were available, we calculated shares of dominant and titular ethnic groups in a given country and autonomy. The results again uncover the diversity of ERAs across the globe. We find that the mean value of the share of a titular group in the population of ERAs is 60.3 percent, and out of 123 cases, 63 percent have a share of titular ethnicities above 50 percent in the region. At the same time, we find that in 45 other cases the titular group does not prevail in the population of an ERA (17 percent Mongols in Inner Mongolia, 12 percent Khakas people in Khakasia, 7 percent Karelians in Karelia, 8.6 percent Harari people in the Ethiopian region Harari, etc. while in the Jewish Autonomous District (Russia) it is a mere 1 percent).

Indeed, the share of a titular group in an autonomy cannot be assumed to be an indicator of the ethnic character of a subnational unit. In other words, it is not necessary for an ethnic group to hold an absolute majority in order to obtain political autonomy. The ethnic character of a subnational unit can be based on different grounds. For instance, the Harari people's ethnic identity largely rests on the fact that the city of Harar was historically an important center of Islam, which was the reason for the creation of a separate Harari region in 1995. In spite of their small number, the Muslim Harari people keep control over the regional government, although they share it with the representatives of the Oromo people, who are the largest ethnic group in the region. Some interesting research questions arise from such findings; for example, how do smaller groups maintain their special relations with the center? Is it institutional equilibrium, path dependency, or something else? The ERAD can serve both for testing these hypotheses quantitatively or for careful case selection in qualitative studies.

Last but not least, ERAs demonstrate great variation in their political characteristics, especially in comparison to their host countries. While some autonomies resemble nation-wide political institutions (government systems, electoral systems, etc.), others design their governance structures on their own. For example, some autonomies keep the traditional system of power (Rotuma in Fiji, indigenous comarcas in Panama), while South Tyrol and Northern Ireland introduced specific power-sharing mechanisms. Regional party systems are a good indicator of the peculiarities of political process in ERAs. Leaving aside some countries where they are banned (Russia, China, Nigeria, Philippines etc.), we found ethnoregional parties (ERPs)<sup>54</sup> in almost all the cases in our data. ERPs' significance varies across autonomies: in full ethnic federations such as Belgium or



Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost all political parties are ethno-regional ones, so that each ethnic entity (ERA) actually has its own party system. Moreover, a party system where ERPs absolutely dominate in the regional legislature alongside representation at the national level exists in some ERAs of unitary states (Greenland and Faroe Islands in Denmark, Åland Islands in Finland, Canadian Quebec, Iraqi Kurdistan). On the other hand, there are many ethnoregional autonomies (Friuli Venezia Giulia in Italy, Indian states Gujarat, Tripura, West Bengal and so forth) where ERPs are in a fairly marginal position and concede to the national parties even in regional politics. However, most of ERAs have both all-national and ethno-regional political parties, though the relations between them range from cooperation to acute contestation. The data collected in the ERAD allow us to make comparative studies aimed at the explanation of these differences as well as their ethnopolitical effects.

How do the regional ethnic autonomies cluster together along the major dimensions? The scatterplot in Figure 4 reveals that there are two divergent trends: one for provinces with a large territory and an average or small population (Yakutia, Greenland, Nunavut, Quebec, Xingjian Uygur, Inner Mongolia and Tibet being the most representative), the other is completely the opposite – averagely populated or small in territory (Maharashtra, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab Pak, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Gujarat, Guangxi Zhuang, Orissa, Kerala, Sindh, Oromia, Punjab, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang Uyghur, Jammu and Kashmir, South Sudan, Tibet, Quebec, N Greenland, Yakutiya).<sup>55</sup> These variables included area/population size




FIGURE 4 Scatterplot of Area vs. Population Size.

Values are centered and standardized (zero represents the mean of the population with standard deviations on the axis).




FIGURE 5 Variables Factor Maps for the Four Largest Components in ERA Data.

and their respective shares in the country, economic level relative to the country average, share of ERA's economy in the country, proportion of the titular group in autonomy's population, and representation in the national legislative branch.

All variables were fixed at their 2005 values to minimize the amount of missing data. For the latter, we performed imputation with median values replacing NAs. Median values were used instead of means because the distributions of the variables like population and area size are heavily skewed. Variables were centered and scaled, then PCA with a "varimax" rotation was performed. It reveals a great degree of heterogeneity in the data: it takes seven components to explain 92 percent of the variation in the data: the largest components explain 27 percent and 16 percent of the variation respectively. Four principal components have an eigenvalue greater than 1, calling for a closer inspection. Factor loadings for the first two principal components accounting for 43 percent of the variance are shown in Figure 5. The largest component differentiates between relatively large and relatively small autonomies with regards to their share in the country's area, population, and economy. Former cases also tend to be larger in absolute population size numbers and have stronger representation in national legislatures. The second component contains area size, economic level relative to the country's average, and an index of seats in the national legislature as positively correlated factors. Belgium and Bosnia and Herzegovina are exemplary cases of the first component, as regions in both countries are roughly equal in size. Huge resource-endowed autonomous districts in Russia with small populations and overrepresentation in the national legislature illustrate the second component.

The third and the fourth components, which account for an additional 20 percent of the variation, also differentiate between more and less

populated autonomies (PC3), as well as between relatively small regions that have a large share of the population in the country and large unpopulated provinces mostly linked to indigenous people. These results give us some insights about pathways to autonomy: on the one side of the spectrum there are territories with a high concentration of an ethnic group whose share of the total population is moderate or high, and on the other – sparsely populated remote regions. In other words, autonomy status is granted to either strong ethnic groups in order to retain their loyalty, or to groups that have to be protected due to their fragile situation. Obviously, these are two absolute cases and most of the actual observations fall in between.

## CONCLUSION

Ethnic regional autonomies represent a special case of decentralization strategy in order to preserve the integrity of a given state. In this article, we develop a conceptual framework that differentiates ERAs from other instances of power devolution. We argue that the combination of meaningful self-governance and an ethnic basis of the territory constitutes ethnic regional autonomy. This definition helps us to identify the population of ERAs across the globe. For the first-tier subnational units we found 140 cases in 34 countries for the period of 2001–2015. Based on this list, we developed the Ethnic Regional Autonomies Dataset with approximately 150 variables describing demographic, political, economic, institutional, and policy-related dimensions.

The ERAD provides researchers with new instruments, which make it possible to carry out a broad range of comparative studies that relate to ethnic politics. These studies can be divided into several directions. The first concerns ethnic diversity management. By now it has already been argued that granting an ethnic group territorial autonomy is not sufficient for ethnic conflict resolution. While in some cases autonomous arrangements ensure ethnic peace, in other cases they are unable to achieve it. Consequently, it is important to unpack the autonomy's features to identify specific arrangements conducive for ethnic peace. Moreover, various institutional designs may have different effects depending on several contextual factors such as socio-economic and political conditions, ethnic structure of both autonomous entities and host countries, and so forth. Thanks to the extensive scope of variables, the ERAD facilitates the study of such complex issues.

The second direction, on the contrary, is aimed at explaining variability of ethnic autonomous regimes and political processes in ERAs. What are the differences between autonomies in democratic and authoritarian

settings, in wealthy and poor countries/regions, and in highly fragmented and relatively homogeneous societies? How do their origin and historical paths impact the autonomous arrangements? In particular, are older autonomies more stable during the waves of ethnic mobilization? What difference makes the nature of electoral coalitions between ethnic regional parties and national ones? How different is the dynamics of territorial power-sharing across the contexts? Does deeper autonomy reinforce the ethnic identity and what does it mean for relations between the central government and ERA?

Finally, much work should be done with regard to the quality of data on ethnic autonomies. At present, the ERAD includes all ethnic entities of federations and ethnic regions with special autonomous status in unitary states. It would be useful to expand the scope of the analysis to those ethnic regions in unitary states which have not a special status but accord with the criteria of autonomy. Likewise, the ERAD focuses on administrative units of the first subnational (regional) level, while there are a lot of cases of ethnic territorial autonomies on the lower tiers: ethnic cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, numerous ethnic autonomous districts in China, ethnically defined local governments in some Ethiopian regions, territorial autonomous councils in some Indian states, etc. Expanding the scope of the analysis to cases beyond the first-tier subnational level will improve our knowledge about the nature and variability of ethnic territorial autonomies.

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## NOTES

1. Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

2. Roeder argues that “Rather than capturing the benefits of simple federalism in an ethnically plural society, ethnofederalism shapes the agenda of politics and distributes power in ways that increase the likelihood of escalating challenges to the common-state from alternative nation-state

projects" (Philipp Roeder, "Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms," *Regional and Federal Studies* 19, no. 2 (2009): 204). On the contrary, other scholars find many cases of effectiveness of autonomous arrangements in ethnic conflicts' resolution, see for example: Stefan Wolff, "Complex Power-sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in Contemporary Conflict Settlements," *Ethnopolitics* 8, no. 1 (2009): 27–45; Thomas Benedikter, *Solving Ethnic Conflict through Self-Government: A Short Guide to Autonomy in South Asia and Europe* (Bolzano: Europe Academia EURAC, 2009).

3. Adrian Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012); *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States*, edited by Yash Ghai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Alain Gagnon and Michael Keating, *Political Autonomy and Divided Societies: Imagining Democratic Alternatives in Complex Settings* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*, edited by Marc Weller and Katherine Nobbs (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

4. *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*, edited by Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2004); Kristin Bakke, *Decentralization and Intrastate Struggles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Shane Barter, "Rethinking Territorial Autonomy," *Regional Studies* 52, no. 2 (2017): 298–309; Dawn Brancati, *Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Lars-Eric Cederman, Simon Hug, Andreas Schadel, and Julian Wucherpfennig, "Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?" *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 2 (2015): 354–70.

5. Shane Barter, "Rethinking Territorial Autonomy," 299–300.

6. The ERAD and the codebook are available at: [http://identityworld.ru/index/database\\_eng/0-22](http://identityworld.ru/index/database_eng/0-22) (accessed 1 Aug. 2018).

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8. Monica Toft, "The Field of Ethnic Conflict Studies: An Interplay of Theory with Reality," *Ethnopolitics* 16, no. 1 (2017): 7–8.

9. *Minorities at Risk Project* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2009).

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11. Nils Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict. 1946–2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–37.

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17. Dawn Brancati, "Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism," *International Organization* 60, no. 3 (2006): 651–85.

18. Graham Brown, "Regional Autonomy, Spatial Disparity and Ethnoregional Protest in Contemporary Democracies: A Panel Data Analysis, 1985–2003," *Ethnopolitics* 8, no. 1 (2009): 47–66.

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21. Liam Anderson, "Ethnofederalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: Assessing the Alternatives," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 46, no. 1 (2016), 3.
22. *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States*, edited by Yash Ghai, 8.
23. Manuel Vogt, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin, "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset Family," 1331.
24. Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, "Concepts and Measurement: Ontology and Epistemology," *Social Science Information* 51, no. 2 (2012): 205–16.
25. Maria Ackren, *Conditions for Different Autonomy Regimes in the World. A Fuzzy-Set Application* (Abo: Abo Akademi University Press, 2009); *Practising Self-Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous Regions*, edited by Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*, edited by Marc Weller and Katherine Nobbs.
26. Alain Gagnon and Michael Keating, *Political Autonomy and Divided Societies: Imagining Democratic Alternatives in Complex Setting*, 3.
27. Thomas Benedikter, *Solving Ethnic Conflict through Self-Government: A Short Guide to Autonomy in South Asia and Europe*, 11.
28. *Practising Self-Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous Regions*, edited by Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman, 7; Susan Henders, *Territoriality, Asymmetry, and Autonomy: Catalonia, Corsica, Hong Kong, and Tibet* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 6.
29. Though in many countries there is an upper house, which is usually based on subnational units' representation, by this indicator we mean, first of all, the lower house of the national legislatures which exist in almost all the countries of the world regardless of the political regime (even in countries like Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, etc.). In most cases, when the boundaries of electoral districts and administrative units coincide, at least partially, it is a direct representation of a region. Some countries (e.g. Moldova) use party list proportional representation with the single national district. However, if the population of ERA participates in elections, we consider it as the representation of a region in the national assembly. "Associated states," on the contrary, need not be represented in the national legislatures: they communicate with national governmental bodies on issues of their interests on bilateral ground through their special representatives. In regard to "non-recognized/de-facto states," these kinds of states are frequently granted representation in national legislature but do not elect to take advantage of their chance for representation, as they do not participate in elections (Abkhazia in Georgia, Chechnya in Russia in the late 1990s, etc.)
30. Anderas Wimmer, *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7.
31. *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States*, edited by Yash Ghai, 4; Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 17–18.
32. Thomas Benedikter, *Solving Ethnic Conflict through Self-Government: A Short Guide to Autonomy in South Asia and Europe*, 10.
33. See, for example: Julie George, *The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 29; Donna Van Cott, "Explaining Ethnic Autonomy Regimes in Latin America," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 4 (2001): 30–58; *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States*, edited by Yash Ghai.
34. *Practising Self-Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous Regions*, edited by Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman, 2.
35. Liam Anderson, "Ethnofederalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: Assessing the Alternatives," 18, ref.2.
36. In a softer form, the empirical indicator may be the claims for linguistic/religious rights, not self-determination as such. Thus, in post-colonial India, the movement for reorganization of the administrative division on the basis of linguistic lines, instead of colonial administrative boundaries, resulted in the adoption of The States Reorganization Act in 1956. Many of the present-day Indian states were founded on the grounds of linguistic/religious specificity.
37. In some countries such as Russia (the former Soviet Union), China, and Ethiopia, the state "national policy" was ideologically directed by the idea of the right of nations to self-determination

and entailed the creation of “ethnic” subnational units such as “national republics” in the Soviet Union, ethnic regions in China and Ethiopia, etc.

38. Philip Roeder, “Secessionism, Institutions, and Change,” *Ethnopolitics* 13, no. 1 (2014): 93.

39. Daniel Elazar, *Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements* (Harlow, Essex, U.K.: Longman Current Affairs Harlow, 1994), xvi.

40. Regions with a special status have been distinguished from all others on the basis of the data systematically gathered in ISO (International Organization for Standardization) and Statoids - Administrative Divisions of Countries Project (Gwillim Law, *Administrative Subdivisions of Countries. A Comprehensive World Reference* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011).

41. Though some legal scholars make a distinction between autonomies as special units in unitary states and federations (see, for example: Markku Suksi, *Sub-State Governance through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2011), we follow Anderson’s approach that “[t]he ethnically defined territorial autonomy... includes system-wide federations in which one or more of the subunits is ethnic, and systems in which ethnic autonomy is granted by an otherwise unitary state” (Liam Anderson, “Ethnofederalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: Assessing the Alternatives,” 3–4). Cederman and his colleagues also shares such a view: “territorial power-sharing implies that an ethnic group enjoys autonomy in at least one region predominantly settled by itself. Such autonomy includes federal arrangements that are based on territorial units conferring regional autonomy to specific ethnic groups, which are then often described as ethnofederal” (Lars-Eric Cederman, Simon Hug, Andreas Schadel, and Julian Wucherpfennig, “Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?”, 355).

42. Because of the vagueness in constitutional foundations in some countries (Spain, Tanzania, South Africa, Iraq, etc.), there is no full agreement among scholars on the issue of how many countries are in fact fully federal states: the number ranges between 20 and 30 in the literature (Liam Anderson, *Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems: Accommodating Diversity*; Jenna Bednar, *The Robust Federation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Daniel Elazar, *Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements*; Ronald Watts, *Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s* (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1996)). Some disputed cases that are considered as federations by some authors but not by others are interpreted on the basis of their legal (constitutional) definitions. Therefore, such decentralized states (regionalized states, quasi-federations) as Spain, Italy, and South Africa are defined as unitary states. On the other hand, Tanzania, Iraq, Sudan (2005–2011), and Myanmar are defined as federations, namely partial ethnofederations with seven ethnic regions in Myanmar and one each per remaining case.

43. Henry Hale, “Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse,” *World Politics* 56, no. 2 (2004): 167–68.

44. There do exist non-ethnic units in all these cases: Brussels in Belgium; Brcko as a neutral, self-governing administrative unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina; two cities with the special status in Ethiopia; and Islamabad Capital Territory in Pakistan.

45. Liam Anderson, *Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems: Accommodating Diversity*, 3.

46. Brendan O’Leary, “An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federation? A (Neo-Diceyan) Theory of the Necessity of a Federal Staatsvolk, and of Consociational Rescue,” *Nations and Nationalism* 7, no. 3 (2001): 285.

47. In some cases, it was difficult to unambiguously interpret the federal entities as ERAs. For example, Nigeria, where there are three “major” (“dominant”) ethnic groups (Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba) instead of a single “Staatsvolk,” was initially a full ethnofederation; each of these ethnic groups had their own autonomous region. However, after administrative reforms, the three regions were divided into 36 federal entities so that each of three “ethnic majorities” dominates in some states, while the rest of the regions are linked to definite minority ethnic groups. In the ERAD, we follow those scholars who argue that these reforms made Nigeria look like a partial ethnodederation, and, due to this logic, only those states which were founded for ethnic minorities can be interpreted as ethnic regional autonomies (Liam Anderson, *Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems: Accommodating Diversity*, 161–162; Abdul Mustapha, *Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Nigeria* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2006), 11). Switzerland constitutes an even more complicated case. Although ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious cleavages



were meaningful in the process of the creation of the Swiss Confederation in the middle of the 19th century and still persist in the society, many scholars question that they ever became a crucial issue for the differentiation between cantons (Wolf Linder and Isabelle Steffen, *Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the Public Sector in Switzerland* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2006), 2). "Where religious, territorial-cum-cantonal, and ethnic affiliations are not congruent, but cut across each other in multiple ways, the ethnic majority-minority dividing-line is broken" (Bruno Schoch, *Switzerland – A Model for Solving Nationality Conflicts?* (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute, 2000), V). Following this view, the only Swiss canton, Jura, which was established in 1979 after a long struggle of the French-speaking community to separate itself from the German-speaking Bern, clearly complies with our criteria and can be included in the ERAD.

48. Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Reissued Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998), 10.

49. Anderas Wimmer, *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks*, 4.

50. *Conflict Barometer* (Heidelberg: The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2015).

51. In the ERAD, the year of the creation of an ERA (the variable "start\_year") is dated on the basis of its present autonomous status in the current state. For instance, the existence of Scotland as an ERA dates back to 1998, not to the 1707 Acts of Union; Russian ethnic republics are interpreted as they were founded in 1992, not in the 1920s, when many of them were established as Soviet republics in the USSR. In the cases when there was a gap in the existence of autonomy, we take the year that autonomy was re-established.

52. Ted Gurr, "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (1994): 347–377.

53. Graham Brown, "Regional Autonomy, Spatial Disparity and Ethnoregional Protest in Contemporary Democracies: A Panel Data Analysis, 1985–2003"; Nicholas Sambanis and Branko Milanovic, "Explaining Regional Autonomy Differences in Decentralized Countries," *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 13 (2014): 1771–1800.

54. Unlike all-national parties, ethnoregional parties are political parties that manifest themselves as representatives of particular ethnic groups, and their activities are primarily limited to the regions where the respective groups are localized (Dawn Brancati, "The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties," *British Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (2008): 135–159; Régis Dandoy, "Ethno-regionalist Parties in Europe: A Typology," *Perspectives on Federalism* 2, no. 2 (2010): 194–220).

55. We used PCA instead of factor analysis as we did not assume the latent variable structure of the data but concentrated on pure data reduction. See Jason Osborne, Anna Costello and J. Thomas Kellow, *Best Practices in Exploratory Factor Analysis* (Louisville: Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2014).

**Petr Panov** is Professor of Politics at Perm State University, Russia, and a Chief Fellow of Perm Federal Research Center (the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences). His research interests focus on ethnic politics in comparative perspective. He is particularly interested in political institutions and mechanisms of interethnic accommodation. E-mail: panov.petr@gmail.com

**Andrei Semenov** is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, and Director of the Center for Comparative History and Politics, Perm State University. As an academic his main interests are in comparative studies of contentious politics, ethnic conflicts, and social movements. E-mail: andre.semenoff@gmail.com

## APPENDIX. LIST OF ETHNIC REGIONAL AUTONOMIES

## Core List

Belgium	Flemish Region, Walloon Region
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska
Canada	Nunavut, Quebec
China	Guangxi Zhuang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Hui, Tibet, Xinjiang Uyghur
Denmark	Faroe Islands, Greenland
Ethiopia	Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, Harari, Oromia, Somali, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region, Tigray
Fiji	Rotuma
Finland	Aland Islands
France	Corsica
India	Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Goa, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Telangana (since 2015), Tripura, West Bengal
Indonesia	Aceh (since 2005), Papua
Iraq	Kurdistan (since 2005)
Italy	Aosta Valley, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, South Tyrol
Mauritius	Rodrigues (since 2002)
Moldova	Gagauzia
Myanmar	Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan
Nicaragua	North Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region, South Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region
Nigeria	Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Delta, Edo, Kogi, Niger, Rivers, Yobe
Pakistan	Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh
Panama	Embera Wounaan, Guna Yala, Ngabe Bugle
Philippines	Mindanao
Russia	Adygeya, Agin-Buryat AD (untill 2008), Altay, Bashkortostan, Buryatiya, Chechnya, Chukotka, Chuvashiya, Dagestan, Evenk AD (untill 2007), Ingushetiya, Jewish AO, Kabardino-Balkariya, Kalmykiya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Khakasiya, Khanty-Mansi AD, Komi, Komi-Permyak AD (untill 2005), Koryak AD (untill 2008), Marii El, Mordoviya, Nenets AD, North Ossetiya, Tatarstan, Taymyr AD (untill 2007), Tuva, Udmurtiya, Ust-Orda Buryat AD (untill 2008), Yakutiya, Yamalo-Nenets AD
Spain	Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Navarre
Sudan	South Sudan (2005-2011)
Switzerland	Jura
Tajikistan	Gorno-Badakhshan
Ukraine	Crimea (untill 2014)
United Kingdom	Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales
Uzbekistan	Karakalpakstan

## Borderline List

France	French Polynesia, New Caledonia
Georgia	Ajara
India	Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim
Italy	Sicily
Malaysia	Sabah, Sarawak
Netherlands	Aruba, Netherlands Antilles (since 2010 Curacao and Sint-Martin)
Nigeria	Cross River, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville
Tanzania	Zanzibar